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The WTO negotiations broke down on July 30th, 2008 because members could not 
bridge their differences over the operation of a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). 
This article evaluates the latest SSM proposal using the world wheat market as our 
case study. Whether low-income WTO members should be allowed to breach their pre-
Doha bound tariffs is a key element of our analysis. The SSM leads to sizeable 
additional duties but is not very trade distorting, even when pre-Doha bound rates are 
breached. Moreover, the extent to which low-income countries should be allowed to 
exceed pre-Doha bound rates depends heavily on the product under consideration, the 
ambition of the tariff cutting exercise, and the gap between members’ bound and 
applied tariffs. 
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Introduction 
egotiations over the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for low-income 
countries in the WTO’s agricultural negotiations intensified in July of 2008, and 
ultimately proved to be a major reason for the failure of the talks that were expected to 
produce the final modalities for agricultural trade reform.
1 That a seemingly small 
technical detail such as the SSM would lead to the collapse of the mini-ministerial 
meeting in Geneva came as a shock to international trade economists and policy 
makers alike. How could ministers walk away from a new round of agricultural trade 
reforms over failure to agree on a temporary safeguard tariff designed to counter 
import surges or sharp price declines in low-income countries?  
The collapse of the WTO negotiations concerning agricultural trade is not about 
the inclusion of the SSM in the modalities. It is not even about the general structure of 
the SSM. Instead, it is about one possible outcome arising from the application of the 
SSM: should low-income countries be allowed to exceed their pre-Doha bound tariffs 
when the SSM is triggered (WTO, 2008a)? Developing countries want the maximum 
amount of policy flexibility to levy additional SSM duties to protect small-scale 
farmers, even if it means breaching pre-Doha bound tariffs. Moreover, for some 
products in developing countries applied and bound tariffs are very similar, which 
makes it almost impossible not to exceed pre-Doha bound tariffs when the SSM is 
triggered. China’s tariff structure due to its recent accession is just one example. On 
the other hand, the United States needs to sell the Doha Round to agricultural 
stakeholders on the basis of new market access opportunities, and the optics of 
allowing developing-country importers to raise their tariffs above pre-Doha bound 
levels is viewed as a “deal breaker”.    
In this study we use a global, stochastic, partial equilibrium model developed in 
Grant and Meilke (2006) to quantify the impact of the SSM when it is used in 
conjunction with tariff cuts according to the recent July Package proposal (WTO, 
2008b). Three scenarios are evaluated. First, we cut world wheat tariffs according to 
the July Package formula. Second, we repeat the tariff cutting exercise and allow low-
income countries (developing and least-developed) the right to the July Package SSM 
but do not allow them to exceed their pre-Doha bound tariffs when the SSM is 
triggered. In the final scenario, we allow low-income countries to exceed their pre-
Doha bound tariffs when the SSM is triggered. To keep the analysis tractable, we 
focus on the world wheat market – a staple commodity in many low-income countries. 
Nevertheless, the results from this study may provide important insights for policy 
makers that can help guide further negotiations over the SSM. 
Specifically, this article addresses four questions surrounding the SSM: 
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1.  In terms of economic welfare, how costly is the SSM, particularly when low-
income countries exceed their pre-Doha bound tariffs? 
2.  How often will low-income countries make use of the SSM? 
3.  What is the size of the additional SSM duties and how often will low-income 
countries exceed their pre-Doha bound tariffs if such a provision is allowed?  
4.  Can the SSM stabilize domestic wheat markets in low-income countries? 
Negotiations and Concerns over the SSM 
he need for an SSM was first acknowledged in early 2003 (WTO, 2003a; WTO, 
2003b). Little progress was made in refining the proposed SSM mechanism 
before the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005, where ministers 
agreed that the SSM would be available only for developing countries and that it 
would have both a price and a volume trigger (WTO, 2005). In March of 2006, the 
G33, a group of (now 42) developing countries, tabled what was widely considered 
the most concrete proposal for an SSM at that time (WTO, 2006). The G33 proposal 
formed the basis of Agriculture Chair Crawford Falconer’s draft modalities tabled in 
February 2008 and the subsequent revision of May 2008 (WTO, 2008c; WTO, 
2008d). However, as discussed below, the G33 proposal has the potential to generate 
large additional SSM duties. For this reason, Falconer’s original SSM proposals of 
February and May 2008 contained numerous “bracketed” options reflecting the 
divergence of views among WTO members.  
After a third draft of the modalities texts, tabled in July 2008, it appeared that 
WTO members had reached a consensus on many of the modalities’ technical aspects, 
except for the question of whether developing countries should be allowed to exceed 
their pre-Doha bound tariffs (WTO, 2008b). Members’ differences on this issue 
proved to be irreconcilable and ultimately led to the collapse of the WTO negotiations.  
A review of the design of the G33 and July Package proposals provides a number 
of insights about the potential problems associated with the SSM. An SSM is a 
temporary tariff that gives low-income countries additional policy flexibility to 
circumvent rapid import surges or sharp price declines. Two trigger levels (price and 
volume) determine when the SSM can be applied. The calculation of the volume 
trigger is equal to the average of the most recent three-year period for which import 
data are available. The price trigger is defined analogously and is equal to the average 
of the most recent three-year monthly c.i.f. import prices (WTO, 2006; WTO, 2008b). 
Because of the disagreement over the additional duties concerning the volume trigger, 
we start by discussing its operation first.
2  
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Volume-Based SSM 
The magnitude of the volume-based SSM duty depends on the size of the surge in 
imports. Table 1 illustrates the potential size of the additional SSM duties under the 
G33 and July Package SSM proposals for three countries (India, Bangladesh, and 
China) using the most recent applied and bound tariff data for cereals contained in the 
WTO/UNCTAD’s World Tariff Profiles 2006 report (WTO/UNCTAD, 2008).
3 There 
are minor differences in the size of the import surge required to trigger the volume-
based SSM between the G33 and July Package SSM proposals. For example, the G33 
proposal requires an import surge greater than 105 percent of the volume trigger level 
before an SSM remedy can be applied. Higher additional duties are triggered for 
imports greater than 110 percent but less than or equal to 130 percent, and greater than 
130 percent of the volume trigger. In the July Package SSM, the import surge must be 
greater than 110 percent before the volume-based SSM can be used. The remaining 
bands are set at 115 and 135 percent of the volume trigger.  
Table 1  The G33 and July Package SSM Duties for Cereals 
-------------------------------------------------------------------July Package SSM Proposal---------------------------------------------------------- 
    ---------------------Examples of additional SSM duties---------------- 
   India  Bangladesh  China 
Import surge (X)  Remedy  Tb=120%; Ta=40%  Tb=200%; Ta=10%  Tb=25%; Ta=24% 
       
X <= 110%  No remedy  0% + 40% = 40%  0% +10% = 10%  0% + 24% = 24% 
       
110% < X <= 115%  Max{0.25*Tb, 25 percentage points}  30% + 40% = 70%  50% + 10% = 60%  25% + 24% = 49% 
        
115% < X <= 135%  Max{0.4*Tb, 40 percentage points}  48% + 40% = 88%  80% + 10% = 90%  40% + 24% = 64% 
        
X > 135%  Max{0.5*Tb, 50 percentage points}  60% + 40% = 100%  100% + 10% = 110%  50% + 24% = 74% 
       
-------------------------------------------------------------------------G33 SSM Proposal-------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ---------------------Examples of additional SSM duties---------------- 
   India  Bangladesh  China 
Import surge (X)  Remedy  Tb=120%; Ta=40%  Tb=200%; Ta=10%  Tb=25%; Ta=24% 
       
X <= 105%  No remedy  0% + 40% = 40%  0% + 10% = 10%  0% + 24% = 24% 
       
105% < X <= 110%  Max{0.50*Tb, 40 percentage points}  60% + 40% = 100%  100% + 10% = 110%  40% + 24% = 64% 
        
110% < X <= 130%  Max{0.75*Tb, 50 percentage points}  90% + 40% = 130%  150% + 10% = 160%  50% + 24% = 74% 
       
X > 130%  Max{Tb, 60 percentage points}  120% + 40% = 160%  200% + 10% = 210%  60% + 24% = 84% 
Source: World Tariff Profiles 2006 (WTO/UNCTAD, 2008) 
Note: Tb and Ta denote bound and applied tariffs, respectively. In the columns labelled India, 
Bangladesh, China, the first number denotes the maximum additional SSM duty that can be 
applied for a given import surge; the second number denotes the country’s current applied tariff;   J.H. Grant and K.D. Meilke 
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and the third number denotes the country’s new augmented applied tariff inclusive of the SSM 
duty.The cells shaded in grey illustrate cases where the new applied tariff exceeds the pre-
Doha bound tariff rate (Tb). 
 
More significant differences between the G33 and July Package SSM proposals 
appear when we look at the size of the additional duties for two developing countries 
(India and China) and one least-developed country (Bangladesh) in table 1. The 
variables Tb and Ta denote bound and applied tariff rates for cereal products in 2006, 
respectively. The G33 proposal allows for much larger additional duties within its 
respective bands, with coefficients of 50, 75, and 100 percent of bound tariffs or 40, 
50, and 60 percentage points, whichever is higher. This compares to 25, 40, and 50 
percent of bound tariffs or 25, 40, and 50 percentage points, whichever is higher, in 
the July Package SSM. Thus, for a given bound tariff level, the additional SSM duties 
under the G33 proposal will be roughly double those of the July Package. 
What is noteworthy about the data in table 1 is that if countries choose to apply 
the maximum additional SSM duty, with no restrictions on exceeding pre-Doha bound 
tariff levels, the resulting SSM-augmented applied tariffs are likely to result in no 
trade. The grey shaded cells in table 1 illustrate the potential problems with the July 
Package SSM. India’s 2006 bound and applied tariffs were 120 and 40 percent, 
respectively. If the volume surge is greater than 130 percent above the trigger level in 
the G33 proposal, India is permitted to apply an additional SSM duty of 120 
percentage points, bringing its new applied tariff rate to 160 percent! Even under the 
July Package (assuming pre-Doha bound tariffs can be breached), the new applied 
tariff for India is 100 percent after applying a 60–percentage point SSM duty, which is 
the remedy for a volume surge greater than 135 percent of its trigger level.  
Moreover, least-developed countries that are not making tariff cuts and have even 
larger gaps between bound and applied tariffs will gain a lot of policy flexibility with 
the SSM. Bangladesh’s bound tariff for cereal imports averaged 200 percent in 2006. 
Its applied tariff is just 10 percent. In a situation where import penetration in 
Bangladesh is greater than 130 (135) percent above the volume trigger, the resulting 
tariff is 200 (100) percent with the G33 (July Package) SSM proposal (table 1).  
China’s situation is different, because bound and applied tariffs are very similar. 
This is one case where it is difficult to argue that pre-Doha bound tariffs (or those 
bound tariffs agreed to under accession) should serve as an upper bound for the 
application of SSM duties. Not allowing China to exceed its bound tariff level 
effectively eliminates the SSM policy altogether. This is an important point. When 
additional SSM duties are tied to bound tariffs as in the July Package SSM or G33 
proposal, countries with similar applied and bound tariffs will almost always exceed 
their bound tariffs with the SSM.    J.H. Grant and K.D. Meilke 
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Price-Based SSM 
Figure 1 illustrates the operation of the price-based SSM. This time, however, we add 
in the Uruguay Round Special Agriculture Safeguard (UR SSG) for comparison.
4 The 
G33 price-based SSM allows for full compensation (expressed as a percentage of the 
import price) once prices fall by more than 10 percent below the price trigger, which 
is assumed to be $100 in figure 1. Letting P
m denote the current c.i.f. import price in 
local currency and PT the price trigger level, the remedy allowed under the G33 price-
based SSM is PT/Pm-1. The July Package SSM modifies the G33 price-based remedy 
in two ways. First, the c.i.f. import price must fall by more than 15 percent below the 
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Figure 1  Effect on import prices of the G33, July Package, and Uruguay Round 
price-based safeguard mechanisms. 
Note: Ta denotes the applied tariff; Tssg denotes the UR SSG duty, Tg33 denotes 
the G33 SSM duty; and Tjuly denotes the July Package SSM duty.    J.H. Grant and K.D. Meilke 
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Second, the price-based remedy is equal to 85 percent of the fall in the import price 
below the trigger level. Thus the July Package does not allow members to fully offset 
price declines. 
In figure 1 the horizontal axis measures the percentage fall in the import price 
below the $100 trigger level as illustrated by the solid line. The vertical axis measures 
import prices, and each line traces out the behavior of import prices when an 
additional price-based SSM duty is added to the applied tariff. As noted above, import 
prices of $100 are maintained as long as the depth of the price decrease is greater than 
10 percent below the trigger level with the G33 SSM. The July Package SSM 
compensates for 85 percent of the price fall after prices drop 15 percent, so import 
prices decrease linearly beyond a 15 percent fall below the price trigger. Conversely, 
the UR SSG allows for higher additional safeguard duties the greater the fall in the 
import price below the trigger, but never allows for the extent of compensation 
provided in the G33 or July Package SSM.  
Figure 2 plots the size of the additional price-based SSM duties as the import 
price falls by up to 90 percent below the price trigger. Interestingly, all three proposals 
(G33, July Package SSM, and the UR SSG) could potentially exceed pre-Doha bound 
tariff levels if the price fall below the trigger is severe. For example, if import prices 
fall by 60 percent below the trigger, the July Package (G33 proposal) triggers a 198 
(233) percent SSM tariff. These additional duties are more than double the 86 percent 
additional duty allowed under the UR SSG for the same 60 percent price decline. 
As a final note we consider a more fundamental question: why are countries with such 
large differences between their bound and applied tariffs worried about an SSM? With 
so much water in their tariff rates, it appears that low-income countries could 
circumvent import surges and price declines by simply raising applied tariffs within 
their bound rates. However, as Grant and Meilke (2006) point out, there are at least 
three reasons why a country might not want to do this. First, applied tariffs are usually 
specified in domestic legislation and are not easily changed. Second, raising applied 
tariffs makes it clear that the government is favouring domestic producers over 
domestic consumers. Finally, there may be a few politically sensitive commodities 
where applied and bound tariffs are very similar. If a country wants an SSM for even a 
few commodities, it must support the proposal to create this mechanism for all 
commodities. 
   J.H. Grant and K.D. Meilke 
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Figure 2  Additional price-based SSM duties of the Uruguay Round (SSG), G33, and 
July Package proposals. 
 
Stochastic Simulation Model  
e adopt the stochastic, global, partial equilibrium model of the world wheat 
sector developed in Grant and Meilke (2006), which is calibrated to supply 
and demand data over the1999-2001 reference years.
5 The model includes 38 
countries/regions, 32 of which are net importers. Three out of the 32 net importers are 
developed countries and 29 are developing and least-developed importing countries. 
Twenty-five out of the 29 developing and least-developed countries are WTO 
members eligible for an SSM. The equations used to represent a typical wheat 
importing country include a domestic price linkage equation relating the domestic 
price to the world price adjusted for the local exchange rate, the applied tariff rate, 
and, potentially, an additional SSM tariff. Price linkage equations for net exporting 
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countries are similar, except there is no adjustment for tariffs, and modifications are 
made to handle farm programs in the United States and the EU. 
Wheat supply and food and feed demand are functions of domestic prices. Net 
trade (defined as net exports) is calculated with beginning and ending stocks held 
fixed. Global market-clearing determines the world price by forcing to zero the sum of 
net trade across all countries.
6   
In order to simulate the operation of the July Package SSM, pseudo–random error 
terms are incorporated into each country’s supply, food demand, and price linkage 
equations. Random shocks to supply and food demand result in random net imports. 
As imports increase, the volume trigger of the SSM can be breached and the importing 
country is allowed to impose an SSM duty.
7 To introduce some differentiation in 
domestic price movements, a pseudo–random error term is attached to the exchange 
rate in each country’s price linkage equation. In this way some countries will apply the 
price-based safeguard while others will not, and the size of the additional duty 
allowed will vary across countries depending on the size of the error term.
8   
Two domestic policies are incorporated: the U.S. loan rate and the EU’s 
intervention pricing system. In the United States, the average loan rate for wheat 
during 1999-2001 was US$94.80/mt and the average farm price was US$96.63/mt. 
Thus, in the benchmark equilibrium, the loan rate is not binding. However, in the 
stochastic simulations, the farm price may drop below the loan rate. In this case, the 
price received by U.S. producers is not allowed to fall below the loan rate, and the 
government cost of an implied deficiency payment equal to the difference between the 
loan rate and the market price is calculated. We assume that U.S. consumer prices for 
food and feed demand are allowed to follow market prices to levels below the loan 
rate.   
The EU paid substantial export subsidies on wheat in 1999 and 2000, when the 
intervention price was 119 euro/mt. However, almost no export subsidies were paid in 
2001, when the intervention price was lowered to 101 euro/mt. The WTO notifications 
show that EU export subsidy payments averaged 15 euro/mt in 1999-2001. Thus, we 
assume that the EU farm price equals the average intervention price and a 15 euro/mt 
export subsidy payment is incorporated by defining an EU export price for wheat. 
This export price is equal to the farm price minus 15 euro/mt, or 95.6 euro/mt. When 
the world price falls below the 110.6 euro/mt average intervention price, the 
appropriate export subsidy is calculated. In each liberalization scenario, the EU’s 
intervention price is lowered from 110.6 euro/mt to 101 euro/mt, its actual value since 
2001, while the U.S. loan rate program is left unchanged.  
For low-income countries, ad valorem tariffs are the primary policy considered, 
with the exception of China. China was a small net importer during 1995-1999 and   J.H. Grant and K.D. Meilke 
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2004-2005, averaging 3.1 million metric tons (mmt), but it was a small net exporter of 
wheat during 2000-2002 and 2005-2007, averaging 1.5 mmt of net exports. China has 
also established a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) on wheat imports that increased to 9.1 mmt 
over a five-year period.
9 However, the July Package SSM does not allow developing 
countries to use an SSM under scheduled tariff-quota increases (WTO, 2008b). Thus, 
even though China becomes a small net importer of wheat in certain instances of the 
stochastic simulations, we do not allow China the use of the SSM because of its TRQ 
on wheat.  
We are interested in the cost and stability implications of the July Package SSM 
when it is used in conjunction with tariff cuts. Deeper cuts to bound tariffs will result 
in smaller additional volume-based SSM duties. In the July Package tariff cutting 
formula, developed countries face four tiers: less than or equal to 20 percent; greater 
than 20 percent but less than or equal to 50 percent; greater than 50 percent but less 
than or equal to 75 percent; and greater than 75 percent. The tariff cuts in these bands 
correspond to 50, 57, 64, and 66 or 73 percent, respectively (WTO, 2008b).
10 
Developing countries have tiers of zero to less than or equal to 30 percent; greater 
than 30 percent but less than or equal to 80 percent; greater than 80 percent but less 
than or equal to 130 percent; and greater than 130 percent. Developing-country tariff 
cuts are two-thirds of the developed-country cuts within the respective bands. Least-
developed countries are not required to make tariff cuts. 
Results 
hree policy experiments are conducted. Scenario one (July Package tariff cuts) 
assesses the impact of the July 2008 tariff cutting proposal. Scenario two (tariff 
cuts with July Package SSM & Pre-Doha bound tariff cap) evaluates the market 
stability and welfare implications of the July Package SSM for low-income WTO 
members simultaneously with the July 2008 tariff cuts and the provision that low-
income countries can not exceed their pre-Doha bound tariff levels when the SSM is 
triggered. Scenario three (tariff cuts with July Package SSM & no pre-Doha bound 
tariff cap) is identical to scenario two except we allow low-income WTO members to 
exceed their pre-Doha bound tariff levels.  Scenario one is measured with respect to 
the benchmark equilibrium (1999-2001). Scenarios two and three are judged with 
respect to scenario one. The policy results are obtained by averaging the results over 
1000 drawings of pseudo–random errors. In this way, we can measure the number of 
times the SSM is triggered, the size of the additional duties, and effects on the stability 
of key market variables.  
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Scenario 1: July Package Tariff Cuts 
The impacts of the July 2008 tariff cuts (to bound rates) on world market prices are 
modest (table 2).
11 World wheat prices rise by only 3.91 percent and most of this price 
rise (two percentage points) is due to lowering the EU intervention price. This result is 
driven by the large differences between applied and bound tariffs. Cutting bound 
tariffs results in a reduction in applied rates in four countries: Japan, Egypt, Nigeria, 
and a group of other developed countries (DCG) (Iceland, Switzerland, and 
Norway).
12 Domestic prices are more stable for 30 out of 31 net importing countries 
(the exception being Brazil) (table 2). In Japan and the DCG, large tariff cuts result in 
a decrease in the standard deviation of their domestic price by over 38 and 41 percent, 
respectively.   
World welfare increases by 1.15 percent, or $1.28 billion (table 3). However, the 
distribution of welfare changes is mixed. Developed-country importers gain 21.75 
percent on average due to the large tariff cuts (and welfare gains) in Japan and the 
DCG. Developing and least-developed countries lose 2.27 and 2.78 percent, 
respectively, due to higher world prices. All four developed-country exporters gain by 
an average of 1.52 percent due to higher world prices for wheat exports.
13  
Scenario 2: Tariff Cuts with July Package SSM & Pre-Doha 
Bound Tariff Cap 
The July Package SSM with a bound tariff cap at pre-Doha levels results in domestic 
prices rising in 23 out of 31 low-income countries but becoming less stable in 21 out 
of 31 low-income countries, relative to cutting tariffs alone (table 2).
14 However, the 
SSM stabilizes import volumes (over and above cutting tariffs alone) in 27 out of 31 
low-income countries. Moreover, if we restrict our attention to the 25 low-income 
WTO members eligible to use the SSM, imports are stabilized in 23 out of 25 cases 
(the exceptions being Egypt and Malaysia)!
15 World prices fall only slightly (-0.90 
percent) as a result of the SSM and become less stable, with the standard deviation 
increasing by over 16 percent compared to scenario one.  
Several countries, including Mexico, Morocco, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, 
and many least-developed countries, experience large increases in the standard 
deviation around domestic prices (please see the technical annex). This result is driven 
by the size and frequency with which they apply the SSM. For example, Morocco 
increases its domestic price instability by 165 percent because it applies the volume 
safeguard almost 30 percent of the time (296 times out of 1000), well above the 13.7 
percent average for all eligible SSM countries. Moreover, the size of Morocco’s 
applied tariff plus the additional volume-based SSM averages 87 percent, which is 
among the highest of all developing countries. Bangladesh increases its domestic price   J.H. Grant and K.D. Meilke 
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instability by some 574 percent, not necessarily because it applies the volume- or 
price-based SSM excessively (26 and 18 percent of the time, respectively), but 
because its additional volume-based SSM duties range from 50 percentage points (25 
percent of its bound tariff) to 100 percentage points (50 percent of its bound tariff), 
well above the average volume-based SSM duty for all low-income WTO members of 
36 percent. 
On the other hand, there are several countries that stabilize domestic prices using 
the July Package SSM for wheat. For example, the Philippines and South Korea use 
the price-based SSM 29 and 33 percent of the time, respectively, very similar to 
Morocco and Bangladesh’s use of the volume trigger discussed above. However, the 
Philippines and South Korea increase and stabilize their domestic wheat prices 
because they impose smaller price-based SSM duties. The average price-based SSM 
duties for these two countries are 3.8 and 3.9 percent, respectively. 
 
Table 2  Price and Stability Effects for 31 Low-Income Countries 
 
July Package tariff cuts
a 
July Package tariff cuts with 
SSM & cap on pre-Doha bound 
tariffs
b 
July Package tariff cuts with 
SSM & no cap on pre-Doha 
bound tariffs
b 
  -------Mean------- ----Stability---- -------Mean----- ----Stability---- --------Mean------- ----Stability---- 
  Up Down  More  Less Up  Down  More  Less  Up Down  More  Less 
Domestic 
price  31  0  30 1  23 8 10  21  23  8  7 24 
                   
Producer 
surplus  28  0  13 15  21  7  18 10 21  7  16 12 
                   
Imports  3  28 27 4  5 26  27 4  5  26 25 6 
  World price increase = 3.91%  World price decrease = -0.90%  World price decrease = -1.16% 
Note: The results in the table are based on 1,000 pseudo-random draws and show the number 
of countries in each category. For domestic price and imports, there are 31 low-income 
countries (2 are exporters – Argentina and Kazakhstan – and 29 are low-income importers). For 
producer surplus, 3 low-income countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines) have no 
wheat production, for a total of 28 countries in this category. 
a Scenario one (July Package tariff cuts) is measured relative to the baseline (1999-2001). 
b Scenarios two and three (July Package tariff cuts with SSM) are measured relative to scenario 
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Table 3  Summary of Welfare Changes across Each Scenario 
 
-----July Package tariff 
cuts
a---- 
July Package tariff cuts with 
SSM & pre-Doha bound tariff 
cap
b 
July Package tariff cuts 
with SSM & no  
pre-Doha bound tariff 
cap
b 
  Gain Loss 
Welfare ∆ 
(%)  Gain Loss 
Welfare ∆ 
(%)  Gain Loss 
Welfare 
∆ (%) 
Exporters  6 0 1.52 0  6  -0.34 0  6  -0.44 
Developed importers  2  1 21.75 3 0  0.37  3 0 0.48 
Developing importers  0 24 -2.27 16  8  0.05  15  9 0.10 
Least-developed importers  0 5 -2.78 3 2  -0.41  3 2  -0.53 
World 8  30  1.15  22  16  -0.18  21  17  -0.20 
  Welfare gain by value = 
$1.28 billion 
Welfare loss by value =  
$-204 million 
Welfare loss by value = 
$-223 million 
Note: The results in the table are based on 1000 pseudo-random draws. Gain and Loss show 
the number of countries that gained or lost in each category. Welfare ∆ (%) is the average 
change in aggregate economic welfare for all of the countries belonging to a particular category. 
There are 38 countries/regions in the model: 6 are exporters; 3 are developed importers; 24 are 
developing countries; and 5 are least-developed countries. 
a  Scenario one (July Package tariff cuts) is measured relative to the baseline (1999-2001). 
b Scenarios two and three (July Package tariff cuts with SSM) are measured relative to scenario 
one – the tariff cutting scenario without an SSM. 
 
The welfare cost of the July Package SSM is $204 million (table 3), compared to a 
welfare gain of $1.28 billion from trade liberalization (i.e., cutting tariffs alone). Thus, 
84 percent of the increase in world welfare is still realized when low-income countries 
are granted an SSM. All wheat exporters (Australia, Canada, the EU, the United 
States, Argentina, and Kazakhstan) lose slightly when low-income countries are 
granted an SSM. However, 16 out of the 25 low-income WTO members eligible to 
use the SSM gain economic welfare, as higher producer surplus and large increases in 
tariff revenue are enough to offset the decline in consumer surplus. In terms of all 
low-income importing countries (WTO members and non-members), 19 out of 29 
countries gain; however, for least-developed countries, the losses in Bangladesh (-2.86 
percent) and Ethiopia (-0.55 percent) are large enough to result in an average loss (-
0.41 percent) for all least-developed countries (table 3). 
Scenario 3: Tariff Cuts with July Package SSM & No Pre-
Doha Bound Tariff Cap 
he final scenario is analogous to the previous scenario except that we allow 
developing and least-developed countries to (potentially) exceed their pre-Doha 
bound tariff rates when the SSM is triggered. In the interest of space, we briefly 
summarize the stability and cost implications of exceeding bound tariffs with 
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additional SSM duties before turning most of our attention to discussing the frequency 
of application and the size of the additional SSM duties.  
In terms of market stability, domestic prices in 24 (versus 21 in scenario two) out 
of 31 low-income countries become less stable (table 2). Twenty-five (versus 27 in 
scenario two) low-income countries stabilize imports. Moreover, the welfare cost of 
allowing low-income countries to breach their pre-Doha bound tariffs with additional 
SSM duties is $223 million compared to $204 million when we capped tariffs at pre-
Doha bound rates in scenario two. In other words, the welfare cost of exceeding pre-
Doha bound tariffs amounts to just $19 million – a very small amount compared to the 
gains from tariff reform only (table 3).   
Table 4 summarizes pre-Doha bound and current applied tariffs, the frequency of 
SSM use, the average and maximum duties imposed, and the number of times pre-
Doha bound rates are breached for each country eligible to use the SSM. Looking 
across the last row, low-income countries use the price-based SSM relatively more 
than the volume-based SSM, at 23.9 and 14.3 percent, respectively. Bangladesh, a 
least-developed country not making tariff cuts to bound rates, stands out as applying 
the highest volume-based SSM duties. For all others however, countries seem to be 
making use of the maximum duty options contained in the July Package SSM rather 
than applying a duty that is based on a percentage of their bound tariff. This result is 
driven by the fact that as bound tariffs come down through further tariff cuts, so too 
will the size of the additional SSM duties unless there is provision for choosing a 
higher duty, which is the case in the July Package SSM.  
The interesting information contained in table 4 is the number of times a country 
exceeds its pre-Doha bound tariff rate, and whether this is due to the volume- or price-
based SSM. Collectively, all low-income countries exceed their pre-Doha bound 
tariffs an average of 4.6 percent of the time. In fact, 16 low-income WTO members 
never exceed their pre-Doha bound rates with either the price- or volume-based SSM. 
Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, the Asian Developing Group 
(ASG), the South American Developing Group (STA), and Ethiopia are the only 
countries that breach their pre-Doha bound tariff rates. Ethiopia stands out because it 
uses the volume-based SSM almost 40 percent of the time and almost always chooses 
the 25, 40, or 50 percent maximum duties the July Package SSM allows. 
Conversely, Egypt exceeds its pre-Doha bound tariff almost 34 percent of the time 
by applying the price-based SSM. However, there is no gap between applied and 
bound tariffs for wheat in 2001 in Egypt, very similar to China’s case in table 1. Thus, 
the question of whether or not developing countries should be allowed to exceed their 
pre-Doha bound tariffs depends fundamentally on the product being traded, the extent 
to which bound tariffs will be cut, and the gap between applied and bound tariffs.   J.H. Grant and K.D. Meilke 
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Table 4  SSM Frequency and Additional Duty Results, July Package SSM and No Cap 








































Developing                 
Algeria  80  3  26.8%  5.2%  19.2%  40.0%  0.0% 0.0% 27.0% 5.0% 
Brazil  55 13 27.0%  16.8%  44.3%  50.0%  0.2% 0.1% 33.9% 5.6% 
Columbia  124 15 31.4%  2.6%  25.6%  25.0%  0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 5.0% 
Egypt 5  5  33.9%  13.3%  5.0%  40.0%  13.3%  33.9%  31.7%  3.3% 
Indonesia  30  0  25.8%  21.2%  30.0%  40.0%  14.1% 0.1% 35.0% 6.8% 
Korea 9  4  32.8%  5.7%  9.0%  40.0%  5.7%  12.1%  28.7%  4.1% 
Morocco  170 49 19.0%  30.4%  18.9%  50.0%  0.0% 0.0% 38.1% 4.5% 
Mexico  67 28 14.4%  18.2%  12.6%  50.0%  13.4% 0.0% 36.5% 2.9% 
Malaysia  69 11 27.9%  0.1%  18.7%  25.0%  0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 4.5% 
Nigeria  150 81 29.0%  20.1%  17.6%  50.0%  0.0% 0.0% 34.0% 4.0% 
Peru  68 20 26.6%  3.7%  15.9%  40.0%  0.0% 0.0% 25.4% 4.4% 
Philippines  30 15 29.2%  4.4%  18.6%  40.0%  4.4% 0.1% 29.1% 4.0% 
Tunisia  100 20 16.4%  30.6%  17.1%  50.0%  0.0% 0.0% 39.1% 4.8% 
United  A.E.  80  4  16.9%  31.1%  18.7%  50.0%  0.0% 0.0% 38.1% 4.1% 
Venezuela  118 15 26.8%  0.9%  17.9%  25.0%  0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 4.5% 
AFD  72 29 21.4%  14.1%  16.7%  40.0%  0.0% 0.0% 32.1% 4.1% 
ASG  34 10 23.2%  12.1%  15.1%  50.0%  12.1% 0.0% 32.8% 3.5% 
CTA  83  4  23.9%  6.7%  17.6%  40.0%  0.0% 0.0% 27.7% 4.3% 
STA  36 10 18.4%  16.7%  15.8%  50.0%  12.3% 0.0% 36.6% 3.8% 
MEG  35  1  27.0%  0.8%  18.5%  25.0%  0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 4.3% 
Least-
devel.                     
Bangladesh  200 5  18.4%  26.6%  17.9%  100.0%  0.0% 0.0% 78.1% 4.2% 
Ethiopia  30  5  11.8%  39.7%  14.1%  50.0%  39.7% 0.0% 44.8% 4.1% 
NAG  75  7  23.7%  12.3%  16.8%  40.0%  0.0% 0.0% 31.3% 4.9% 
SAG  78  6  26.3%  4.2%  15.3%  40.0%  0.0% 0.0% 28.6% 4.3% 
YE  80  0  20.7%  20.8%  17.3%  40.0%  0.0% 0.0% 33.7% 4.6% 
World  75.16  14.37  23.9%  14.3%  18.2%  43.6%  4.6% 1.9% 33.7% 4.4% 
Note: Freq. of vol. and of price SSM measure the number of times the volume and price SSM 
were triggered out of 1000 random draws; Max. price and vol. safeguard denote the maximum 
duty triggered; and Mean vol. and price safeguard report the average safeguard duty applied 
out of 1000 random draws. See endnote 13 for a description of country/regional aggregations. 
Conclusions  
iscussion over a new SSM for developing countries took centre stage in the July 
mini-ministerial conference in Geneva because WTO members could not bridge 
their differences over the issue of whether developing countries should be allowed to 
exceed their pre-Doha bound tariffs.
16 Chairman Falconer’s recent Draft Text, tabled 
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in July of 2008, commits WTO members to establishing an SSM for low-income 
WTO members as part of an acceptable agricultural package.  
We combined the recent July Package tariff cuts with an SSM for developing 
countries to evaluate the market stabilization and welfare cost of this policy 
instrument. The July Package SSM costs very little in terms of economic welfare. 
When we allow developing and least-developed WTO members the use of an SSM in 
conjunction with tariff cuts, but do not allow them to exceed their pre-Doha bound 
tariffs (scenario 2), global welfare falls by only US$204 million. Similarly, the welfare 
cost of an SSM with no cap on the level of the additional duties results in a welfare 
loss of $223 million. This is a difference of only $19 million, which pales in 
comparison to the welfare gain of $1.28 billion from tariff reform only. However 
representative the world wheat market is, our results suggest that exceeding pre-Doha 
bound tariffs may have been a small price to pay to reach a final deal on agricultural 
reform in the Doha Development Agenda. 
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Endnotes 
                              
1.   In this article we use “low-income” to refer to developing and least-developed 
WTO members. 
2.   That’s not to say that members were in agreement over the price-based SSM. In 
fact, WTO members didn’t even get to the negotiations over the price-based SSM. 
As discussed below, the price-based SSM has the potential to exceed pre-Doha 
bound tariffs as well, but the likelihood of this occurring is probably less than 
with the volume-based SSM (WTO, 2008a).   J.H. Grant and K.D. Meilke 
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3.   We focus on cereals because wheat is used as our case study in the simulation 
exercise. Moreover, a detailed assessment of the potential SSM duties across all 
agricultural sectors is beyond the scope of the current study. 
4.   We refer the reader to Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture for rules 
concerning the Uruguay Round SSG. We did not evaluate the SSG when 
discussing the volume-based safeguard because the issue of exceeding bound 
tariff levels is of almost of no consequence under the SSG, since the volume-
based remedy is equal to one-third of the country’s applied tariff.  
5.   More specific details on the modeling framework and data sources can be found in 
Grant and Meilke (2006). 
6.   The parameters in the model are derived from elasticities in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development’s AGLINK model (OECD, 2002). The 
elasticities are provided in Grant (2003) and available from the authors upon 
request. 
7.   Due to the potential size of the additional volume-based SSM duties, we added an 
autarky condition to each low-income WTO member’s net trade equation that 
does not allow them to switch to a net exporter in the model.  
8.   Due to the low quality of domestic price data that exist for many developing and 
least-developed countries, it is extremely difficult to introduce shipment-by-
shipment price variability for each country. 
9.   For more details on China’s TRQ policy see 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/China/trade.htm 
10.  In the model we cut tariffs by 66 percent in the final developed-country band. 
Least-developed countries are granted an SSM in the model but are not required 
to make tariff cuts. 
11.  For a detailed list of individual country results for all market variables, we refer 
the reader to the technical annex to this article. 
12.  The only reason the July Package tariff cuts force a reduction in Egypt’s applied 
tariff for wheat is because Egypt’s bound and applied rates are both 5 percent.  
13.  The countries in each group are (1) exporters – Australia, Canada, EU-25, the 
United States, Argentina, and Kazakhstan; (2) developed importers – Israel, 
Japan, and a group of developed-country importers (DCG); (3) developing 
countries – Algeria, Brazil, China, Columbia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, South Korea, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and six geographically aggregated groups 
consisting of African developing countries (AFD), Central American developing 
countries (CTA), South American developing countries (STA), Asian developing 
countries (ASG), Middle East developing countries (MEG), and a Rest of the 
World (ROW) group; and (4) least-developed countries – Bangladesh, Ethiopia, 
Yemen, and two geographically aggregated groups consisting of South African 
least-developed countries (SAG) and North African least-developed countries 
(NAG). 
14.  Recall, this scenario is judged with respect to scenario one and not the benchmark 
equilibrium in 1999-2001.    J.H. Grant and K.D. Meilke 
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15.  Some clarification is in order. There are 32 net importing countries in the model. 
Three of these are developed countries (Japan, Israel, and the DCG) that are not 
granted an SSM; three are not members of the WTO in the 1999-2001 baseline 
(Iran, Iraq, and a group called Rest of World, or ROW); and the remaining 
country is China, a small net exporter of wheat. Thus there are, in total, 25 low-
income WTO members eligible to use the July Package SSM. 
16.  There are other elements of the SSM currently under negotiation, including the 
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